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Abstract 
The mo1·eme11t rl 1rorkers hetm!en jobs nw1· play a11 importunt mle i11 determining hoth the average level and overall 
clispasion i11 earnings in w1 ecvnumr. ret. there has hel!ll almost 110 research to date on the extent and nature ofjob 
mohility unci its possihle consectuences jiJr indi,·iduol <!urni11gs in .Ve11· Zealand This study pro\'ides some initial 
empirical results 011 this topic using odmi11istmtin' data prm·ided h.r Statistics Ne11· Zealand (Linked Employee-
Emp/oy<!r Da!cl). lf'e jindthutjoh mohility is I!Xte11sil·e. hut that high rates o(ioh separation during the .first year or fl.Vo 
in a joh e1·enlltal~r dissipate 11·ith tenure. }oh mohilit_\' is gelll!ra/~, . higher cmwng teenagers and young adults. but 
di{/i!rellet's hy g1111der orl! minimal. In fact. Ol'erulljoh nwhility i.' gent.ntl~, . higherjhr men than u-vmen. Individuals 
chu11ging .fohs ren:i\'1.! month~, . earnings thut are. on un•ruge. he/m,· the (!am ings receil·ed by individuals u-ho do not 
clw11gejohs. ll"ejind that joh chunges ore associated 11·ith u nw.,.O\t'ing in this earnings gap. Earnings growth is. on 
o1·eruge. highc.>r jiJr those tdw change juhs than j(Jr those 11 ·ho stuy 11·ith the sun1e <!mployer. However. this result 
disappears Ollce \\ '(' colltrolj()J· o 11·idu 1·urierr o/other cl£!termi11o11ts (?(eumings gro 11 ·th. Firm characteristics appear to 
plu.r important roles in the relationship hent·eenjoh mvhility und eumings. A mm·e to a largerflrm (i.e one ll'ith more 
employees) unci a .finn tlwt j)(n·s higha a\·eruge l..'urnings tu u/1 its t:'lllfJioyees cull result in a substantial increase in 
indil ·icluul eumin{!s. Eomin{!s {!roll'th is ulso /imnd to he ne{!util ·ef,· rl.! lutecl to the time inten ·al betH'een jobs. and the 
.. ~ '-.. . ...._ . . 
initial eurniii{!S ol the: i11dil·iduul. 011ce ll 'i:' hold these indil ·iduul unci firm clwracteris tics constant, however. job 
~ . . 
chuii !!;<.'S h1 · themse!l·es feud to a relutil 'l:' decline i11 eurnill t!S t!I'O\\'th. 
\.. . \. "" 
Introduction 
Vv'e know little about the extent and nature of job mobility 
in c" · Zealand. Similarly. the link between job mobility 
and earnings has ne\ er been thoroughly irl\'estigatcd in 
this country. The purpose of this study is to provide some 
preliminary ernpirical tindings on the movement of 
\\'Orkcrs between jobs. and the consequences of this job 
mobility for the earnings rccci\·cd by these individua ls. 
The underlying notion is that job mobility may play an 
integral rok in the deterrnination of the average kve l of 
carnrngs, as \ve il as the dispersion of earnings. in the 
economy. 
The primary reason for our lack of knowledge about job 
mobility nnd its consequences for earni ngs in New 
Zealand is the unavailability. until now. of a suitable 
longi tudinal database for this type of research. Panel 
d:Ha. allowin\! us to follow the same indi,·iduals over 
.... 
time. arc rare in Ncv.· Zealand. The Dunedin 
Multidisciplinary Health and Dcn~lopment Study and the 
Christchun:h Health and Dcveloprncnt Study continue to 
foliO\\ two colwrts of children born in these respective 
rnelropolitan areas in the 1970's. However. these arc 
relati\'(·ly small samples that arc largely restricted to 
spcci tic geographic areas. and these databascs arc only 
in frequent I y updated.~ !\ panel could be constructed from 
a sun·ey instrument like the Household Labour Force 
Sur\'ey that contains an eight-quarter rotation group 
framework. Howc\ cr. such a panel would be limited to a 
t\\ o-ycar period and earnings information would be 
restricted to a single quarter each year when earnings and 
income data are solicited. 
At this point. administrative data provide the best option 
fnr empirica lly analysing job mobility in New Zealand. 
Administrati,·e data have a particularly advantage for this 
project, bccaus~ recen t overseas studies using similar data 
lw,·c shown the import~tncc of employer characteri stics in 
the determina tion of both job mobility and earnings. 
L i nk~d Employer-Employee Data (LEED) have been 
pro,·idcd by Statistics New Zealand to carry out this 
analys is of job mobility and its consequences for earnings 
to New Zealand. 
The structure of this remammg report is as follows. 
Section 2 provides a brief review of the relevant overseas 
literature in th is area. Section 3 summarises the 
characteristics of the LEED database. discusses the 
ad\'antagcs and disadvantages of these data for the 
spcci tic research questions addressed in this project and 
presents sornc descriptive stati stics on job mobil ity and 
earnings Section 4 presents the results from a regression 
analysis on the potentially complex links between job 
mobility and th~ earnings of individuals. 
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A Brief Literature Review 
Two basic fac ts appear to characterise job mobil ity in 
most countries. Most new jobs end early (i.e., frequent 
early job separations), and long-term employment 
relationships are common (i.e., lengthy job tenure). For 
example, nearly one-quarter of US workers in 1996 
between the ages of 20 and 64 were in their current jobs 
for less than one year. Yet, more than one-quarter of US 
workers examined in the same year between the ages of 
45 and 64 had held their jobs for at/east 2() vears (Farber 
1999). 
These facts are not contradictory. They simply suggest 
that there is a great deal of churning of workers in new 
jobs (especially early in the work li fe) . Yet, employee-
employer matches that survive these first few years tend 
to be relatively long-lived. As a result , hazard rates (the 
probability of a job ending conditional on some elapsed 
time in the job) dec line substantially with tenure. 
There are competing hypotheses for the observed decline 
in hazard rates. They could be attributed to worker 
heterogeneity (mobi li ty could be largely relegated to 
workers who are inherently predisposed to high levels of 
job turnover), or they could be attributed to state 
dependence (early mobi li ty may itself directly lead to 
subsequent mobility). The literature suggests that both 
explanations have meri t, but that unobserved 
heterogeneity alone can not entirely explain the mobi li ty 
patterns that are found (e.g., see Farber 1999 and 
Munasinghe and Sigman 2003 ). 
One issue that has received a great deal of attention in th is 
li terature is whether or not job mobility has increased or 
declined in magnitude over recent decades. The results 
are mixed for the US. Swinnerton and Wial ( 1995) find 
some evidence for a general increase in job mobility 
during the 1980's, but subsequent work by Diebold et al. 
( 1998) and Farber ( 1998) dispute this conclusion and find 
no obvious trend in overall job mobility. 
The association between job mobility and earnings also 
has been examined over the years by both economists and 
other social scientists. Sociologists have noted that job 
mobility is generally negati ve ly correlated with earnings. 
This is sometimes referred to as the "hobo syndrome" 
(e.g., see Munasinghe and Sigman 2003 ), and is often 
attributed to personal characteristics, like lack of 
commitment or motivation, that simultaneously result in 
weaker job attachment and lower wages (either through 
the expendi ture of less effort on the job or reduced human 
capital investments). 
Economists have suggested that the reason behind a job 
separation is often a key factor in determining whether 
the relationship between job mobili ty and earnings 
change is generally positi ve or negative (e.g., see Borjas 
1981 , Gottschalk and Maloney 1985 ). On average, quits 
(voluntary separations that are in itiated by the worker) 
result in wage gains. On average, layoffs, redundancies 
or plant closures (involuntary separations that are initiated 
by the employer) result in wage losses. The latter tends 
to dominate empirically, partly because expectations of 
future job mobility (initiated by either party) tend to 
reduce the incentives for investments in employer-
specific human capital. Lower rates of human capital 
accumulation reduce growth rates in both productivity 
and associated earnings. 
Both the positive and negative aspects of job mobility 
need to be emphasised in th is literature. On the positive 
side, job mobili ty may be part of the functioning of a 
healthy labour market. Emphasis here is often placed on 
the quality of employee-employer matches. The key is 
that the interactions of the unique characteristics of both 
parties result in a particular productivity level. Since the 
exact quality of the match is uncertain a priori , either 
party (or both parties) may have an incentive to dissolve 
the speci fic match in fa vour of alternative matches. This 
'churning' in the earl y stages of the work li fe may be 
advantageous to individuals, employers and society. 
Burgess r!t of. ( 2000) show that job security provisions in 
OECD countries both reduce job mobility and inhibit 
necessary adjustments in the labour market to periodic 
shocks. 
On the negative side, job mobil ity destroys the 
productivity gains associated with long tenure. Although 
not often emphasised in this literature, these negative 
consequences should be related to either market fai lures 
or separations that result from exogenous shocks affecting 
either workers or finns. In the former. the parties who 
initiate the separation may not bear all of the costs 
associated with mobility. ln the latter, the separation is 
simply imposed on the two parties. Both result in 
suboptimal levels of worker mobility (i.e., too many job 
transitions). 
Th is overseas literature suggests that the relationship 
between job mobility and earnings is complex. Although 
job mobility is common. especially among younger 
workers. long job tenure is also frequently observed. Job 
matches fonned between workers and firms often end 
early in the relationship. However, matches that survive 
this initial period are likely to persist for many years. 
Hazard rates arc initially high, but decline substantially 
wi th job tenure. 
The impact of job mobility on earnings is theoretically 
ambiguous. Even in a simple model of the labour market, 
it would be impossible to predict how job changes would 
affect the earnings of an individual. This is at least part ly 
attribu~ablc to the different reasons for a job separation. 
Individuals who voluntari ly quit thei r jobs would be more 
likely to experience an increase in earnings compared to 
individuals who involuntari ly separate from their jobs. 
Yet, if this job mobility involves a subsequent search 
process after a job quit, the earnings in the new job could 
be either above or below the earnings in the previous job 
due to the uncertain outcome of a job search process. 
Ultimately, the impact of job mobility on earn ings is an 
empirical question. We can expect that job changes will 
result in both positive and negative changes in earnings. 
The key is to estimate the average relationship between 
job mobility and earnings, and to isolate the factors that 
are related to both positive and negative associations 
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between these phenomena. In other words. what factors 
make it more or less likely that a job change will result in 
an increase in earnings for an individual? 
Data and Descriptive Statistics on Job 
Mobility and Ea rnings 
The LEED database provides an excellent platform for a 
research programme which examines the extent and 
nature of job mobility and its possible consequences for 
earnings of workers in New Zealand. This database ,_ 
merges monthly, individual PAYE data from the Inland 
Revenue Department (I RD) with the characteristi cs of 
their employers. This allows for the construction of 
complete monthly employment and earn ings histories fo r 
nearly all employed individuals over the period beginning 
in April 1999.·' 
Gi\ en recent studies that emphasise the importance of 
employer characteristics in the relationship between job 
mobilitv and earnings changes (e.g .. see Holzcr 1!1 ol. 
'"' ..... ._ .._ 
200~ ). it is vitally important to have finn-level data for 
this project. With the time that has elapsed since the 
initiation of LEED. we now have a sufficiently long panel 
to begin to look at this O\ era II research question. 
There arc SC\'Cra l obvious deficiencies in the LEED data 
for this project: 
• Lack of information 011 hours and weeks of work . 
Month ly PA \ 'E earnings data arc available for each 
individual. but there is no direct way of convert ing 
this into a measure of hourly earnings. This means. 
- ~ 
for e'Xamplc. that 311 increase in earnings between 
t\\'O jobs cou ld be the result of an increase in the 
\\·age rate. hL)Urs of \\'Ork or some combination of the 
~ 
t\\ 0. 
• Lack of tenure or employmelll history data prior to 
April 1999. This makes it JitTicult to describe 
accurately long-term employment relationships. For 
example. someone Js of April 2005 would have their 
tenure censored at six years. We arc forced to use 
the job mobility data within the sample period to 
rnake inferences about lung-term job tenure. 
• Lack of f ill)' inj(Jrmation 011 the reasons behind joh 
separations. No information is available on the 
reason behind any job turnover. We do not know 
whether separations were initiated by workers (i.e .. 
quits) or firms (i.e .. layo ffs or redundancies). Thus. 
one of the key elements in identifying the association 
bet\\'ccn job mobility and earnings is una,·ailable in 
the LEED datJbasc. 
Despite these dra\\'backs. the LEED data provide a 
number of ~Hh·antagcs fur the analysis ofjob mobility and 
its impact on earnings. 
• Large sample si::e. The LEED data capture nearly 
the en tire population of employment relationships at 
any point in time . ~ As we wil l sec shortl y. this 
database provides infurmation on over one million 
observations in any year. Large samples improve the 
efficiency of our esti mates, and make it possible to 
explore particular aspects of th is job-mobil ity-
earnings relationship within narrow subpopulations. 
• Monthly reports on employment and earnings 
histories. At best, most panel studies update their 
databases annually. This means that we often have 
missing or inaccurate data on job transitions and 
associated earnings. Individuals are often asked to 
recall when job changes occurred. These data are 
prone to recall or measurement error. At the same 
time. earnings data are often recorded only at the 
time of each survey or for the overall period since the 
previous survey. In either case, these data make it 
difticult to know how this job change was related to 
changes in individual earnings. The LEED database 
provides monthly earnings data taken directly from 
employer reports to the IRD. Thus, we can observe 
month-to-month changes in earnings wi thout 
problems associated wi th individual recal l. 
• Employer and Industry Characteristics. Most 
panels that survey individuals provide little 
in fonn:ltion on the characteristics of the finn. Yet, 
recent studies suggest that things like finn size and 
relative pay levels can be closely related to the 
individual earnings and the overall quality of the 
employee-employer match. The LEED database 
provides monthly information on average earnings 
across all workers at the tinn, the number of 
employees and the industry in which the employer is 
located. Furthe1more. by aggregating the employer 
darn by industry, we can construct variables like the 
average monthly earnings in the industry. Of 
course. it is ultimately an empirical question of the 
extent to which these employer and industry 
characteri stics matter in isolating the impact of job 
changes on individual earnings. 
~ ~ 
Employment and Earnings Histories and Job 
Tenure 
Our ini ti al sample for this study, constructed from the 
LEED database. includes all individuals who were 
between the ages of 16 and 64 over our sample period. 
Tabk I, which along with other tables and tigures in this 
report can be found at the end of this document, displays 
some simple descripti ve statistics from these workers 
across tive adjacent annual periods. Each period includes 
earnings and employment histories running from April in 
one year to March in the following year. The tirst period 
runs from April 1999 to March :woo. and the tinal period 
runs from April 2003 to March 2004. Overall. th is was a 
period characterised by a buoyant and expanding 
economy. Average annual real GDP growth was nearly 
~ .1 percent over this tivc-year period (March 1999 to 
March 200~ ). This was considerably above the long-term 
trend growth rate in real GDP of 2.6 percent per year 
recorded since June 1987. The ofticial unemployment 
rate. according to the Household Labour Force Survey, 
declined steadily from 7. 1 percent in March 1999 to 4.2 
percent in March 2004. whi le the average annual growth 
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rate in employment over this five-year period was 2.4 
percent 
The bottom row of Table I shows the number of 
individual observations in each 12-month period used to 
compute these mean statistics. There were over 1.15 
million individuals working between April 1999 and 
March 2000. This figure grew to more than 1.37 million 
between April 2003 and March 2004. This represents an 
increase of nearly one-fifth in these observations of 
individual workers, or an average annual growth rate of 
nearly 3.6 percent over this period. This is consistent 
with an expanding economy and the consequent growth 
in aggregate employment. 
We know from these administrati ve records when and 
how often individuals have changed their employment 
situations. The mean numbers of jobs held over each 
twelve-month period arc listed in the first row of Table I. 
On average, individuals held somewhere between I. 16 
and 1.20 jobs in each twelve-month period. Yet. the vast 
majority of individuals (somewhere between 83.2 and 
85.8 percent) worked for only a single employer in each 
twelve-month period. These results provide evidence of a 
substantial level of job stabil ity among working-age 
individuals in New Zealand. 
The remainder of Table I displays some infonnation on 
average monthly earnings from the LEED database. 
Mean nominal earnings increased from $2,929 in the year 
ending in March 2000 to $3,390 in the year ending in 
March 2004. This represents a 15.7 percent increase in 
nominal earnings over this five-year period. Because of 
price inflation, however, this growth in monthly earnings 
was much smaller in real terms. All earnings figures 
were inflated to January 2005 dollars using the Consumer 
Price Index. The fi ve-year growth in real monthly 
earnings was approximately 6.5 percent. In tenns of 
average annual growth rates, nominal earnings grew at a 
rate of 3. 7 percent, while real earn ings grew at a rate of 
1.6 percent over this sample period. 
Table 2 shows one of the observations on the jobs held by 
workers that cannot be found in other survey data sources 
in New Zealand (e.g., the Population Census, Household 
Labour Force Survey and Quarterly Employment 
Survey). These datasets do not provide information on 
the tenure workers have realised wi th their employers at 
the time of the survey. As a result, we know very little 
from other data sources about the amount of churning or 
job-changing behaviour in this country. 
We first restrict our sample to those individuals who were 
working as of March 200 I. We then count back and 
compute the number months that each individual had held 
a particular job. 5 The proportions of workers holding 
their primary job as of March 200 I for less than 3, 6, 12, 
18 and 24 months arc recorded in Table 2. The same 
procedure is then used for individuals employed as of 
March 2002, 2003 and 2004.6 According to the resulting 
statistics, there is a substantial amount of job churning in 
the New Zealand labour market. Between 7.8 and 9.0 
percent of workers as of March in each year had held 
their jobs for less than three months. Just under a one-
third of workers had been in their jobs for less than one 
year. and nearly one-half had been in their jobs for less 
than two years. 
The descriptive stati stics in Tables I and 2 show patterns 
that arc largely consistent with observations from other 
countries. Although long-term employment relationships 
are common. there is also a great deal of job mobility in 
the New Zea land labour market. 
Table I : Descriptive statistics on employment and earnings histories. 
For Year Ending: 
March March March March March 
Variables: 2000 200 1 2002 2003 2004 
Mean Number of Jobs Over Previous Y car 1.1 7 1.20 1.17 1.1 6 1.19 
% with a Single Job 85.2 1% 83.22% 85. 11 % 85.8 1% 83.65% 
Mean Nominal Monthly Earnings £2.929.36 $2,947.25 $3, 164.58 $3,282.17 $3.390. 16 
%6 Nominal Earnings from Previous Year 0.61% 7.37% 3.72% 3.29% 
Mean Real Monthly Earnings $3,269.17 $3,209.56 $3,370.28 $3,420.02 $3,481.69 
%6 Real Earnings from Previous Year -1.82% 5.0 1% 1.48% 1.80% 
Number of Observations 1.150,882 I ,22 7, I 13 1.227,845 1.250.53 I I ,372,496 
Notes: Data provided by Statistics New Zea land from the Linked Employer-Employee Data (LEE D). The base period in computing real earnings 
using the Consumer Price Index (CPI ) is January 2005. The four-year aH·rage annual growth rates in nommal and rea l month ly earnings implied by 
these series are 3. 72 percent and 1.60 percent. rcspecti'vdy. 
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Table 2: Distribution of job tenure. 
As of: 
Percentage 
of Workers 
Holding 
Main Job 
for Less March March March March 
Than: 2001 2002 2003 2004 
3 Months 8.991Yo 8.03% 7.79% 8.82% 
6 Months 17.55% 16.24% 15.93% 17.0 I% 
12 Months 3 1.24% 30.08% 28. 79°/o 30.55'% 
18 Months 42.05°1o 40.871X) 39.58% 41.09% 
2-l Months -l9.861Yo 49.02% 47.96°~ 49.06cYo 
Number of 1.0 16, 163 I .028, 168 I .048.909 1,159,173 Observations 
Note~ : D:li:J prll\ ido.:J b~ Statistic:-. o.:w Zo.::-~ l and from the LinkcJ 
Emplo) er-Employ~·.: Data ( LEE D). The sampk is restricted in 
\ lard1 of o.:ad1 ;.car to those'' ho arc employed. In cases of multipk 
job:; in that month. th~· one with the highest o.:Jmings is consiJo.:ro.:J to 
be the primJI') job. t\ ~11npk count of months in this primal')· joh 
o'er the pre' iou:. I\\ o years i~ used to establish job tenure. Gi' en the 
ro.:•aricllllll in the kngth of l)Ur sampk po.:rioJ. the maximum tenun: 
aiiO\\ o.:J is ~~ months. 
Estimated Hazard and Survival Rates 
Another way of describing the nature of job mobility is to 
L'Ompute ha2ard rates using the LEED data. We do this 
by restri ct ing the sample to individuals who had started a 
new employment spell between May 1999 and April 
.2000. These ind ividuals arc fo llowed for a maximum of 
52 months (four and one-third yea rs). We then compute 
the proportion that continue in their jobs up to a given 
period. but terminate their spe ll in that month. This is an 
estimate of the probability of exiting employment in a 
gi, en month conditional on sur\'iving in that job until that 
point in time (i.e .. a ha2ard rate). Another \\'ay of looking 
at the same beha\'iour is to compute the survival rates for 
these employment spells. This is the proportion of 
indi,·iduals who remain (or survive) in their jobs for a 
ni,·cn number of months since the start of these 1:' 
employment spe ll s. To sec the importance of gender and 
age on these hazard and sun ival rates. the following 
tigurcs disp lay these results separately for males and 
fe males and tor three differen t age groups ( 16 to 2~ . 25 to 
-+5. and 46 to 6-l ). 
Two f~ti rl y consistent results found overseas arc that 
hazard rates increase initially over the tirst fcvv months in 
the job. but then always 1~1 11 precipitously after that period 
(e.g., sec Farbcr 1999). The former result is presumably ~ 
because the quality of the job match isn't realised for 
se\ era I months. Once both workers and tinns arc able to 
assess the quality of the match. job separations become 
more likely. The second result is most likely caused by 
early mobility occurring among bad job matches once 
these arc known by both parties. Separation rates 
c,·entually decline with job tenure because the surviving 
matches arc increasingly dominated by ·good matches'. 
Figure 1: Estimated hazard rates for workers aged 16 
to 24. 
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Figure I shows the estimated hazard rates separately for 
males and females aged between 16 and 24. The sample 
sizes for computing these statistics among this youngest 
age group arc 64,85 7 for males and 56.056 for females. 
For both genders. hazard rates increase in itially once the 
job spell has stm1ed. peaking at over I 0 percent for both 
groups a ftcr four months on the job. These hazard rates 
then fall steadi ly to under 4 percent a month after more 
than four years on the job. 
The estimated hazard functions for males and females 
·crossover' after nearly one year on the job. Job 
separation rates arc initially higher for males than 
females. but the pattcms are reversed after one year in 
employment. This suggests that job matches involving 
males arc more likely to end early in the relationship. 7 
However. if these matches survive this initial ' trial 
period'. they arc more likely to evolve into a longer-term 
relationship. 
This same pattem between young males and females can 
be seen in the estimated survival rates in Figure 2. These 
arc the L'Stimatcd probabilities that a job march formed 
between May 1999 and April 2000 will survive for at 
least a certain number of months. For example, more 
than 90 percent ofjob matches survive at least one month. 
However, fewer than 40 percent of job matches involving 
young people survive for at least one year, and here the 
rate is slightly higher for females (37.4 percent) than for 
males (34.6 percent ). The crossover point in terms of 
survival rates between males and females happens after 
two years in the job. Males are relative ly more likely 
than females to remain in a job beyond two years. The 
probabi lit ies of young people remaining in a job for 52 
months or more arc estimated to be only 6.2 perccnr for 
males and 5.0 percent for females. 
Figures J and 4 display both the estimated hazard and_ 
sur ival rates for males and females between the ages ot 
25 and -l5. The sample sizes for computing these 
statiStiCs arc 130,393 for males and I 08.430 for females. 
These li ndings can be contrasted with those found earl ier 
for the younger age group. Firstly. there is no evidence of 
ri sing hazard rates for this prime working-age group over 
the first few months on the job. Younger workers showed 
evidence of increases in monthly separation rates over the 
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-first four months on the job. The hazard rates for these 
prime working-age groups decl ine more-or-less steadily 
beginning with the first month on the job. Presumably 
this is because the qual ities of the job matches involving 
older workers are revealed sooner among older workers. 
This explanation is also consistent with the relatively 
lower hazard rates among this older group. Where less 
than 40 percent of males and females between the ages of 
16 and 24 were likely to remain in jobs for at least one 
year, the same is true for more than 40 percent of males 
and females between the ages of 25 and 45. 
Figure 2: Estimated survival rates for workers aged 
16 to 24. 
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Figure 3: Estimated hazard rates for workers aged 25 
to 45. 
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Like teenagers and young adults, however, male and 
female hazard rates for prime working-age individuals 
display a similar crossover point. Up to the first year in a 
job, females have lower estimated hazard rates than males 
among those aged between 25 and 45. But beyond one 
year on the job, the hazard rates are relatively higher for 
women. The flatter hazard profile for women may 
indicate that relatively more is known about the quality of 
their job matches a priori, and that other life events (e.g .. 
child birth) unrelated to match qualities may play a larger 
role in interrupting their employment histories. It should 
be noted that although survival rates are initially higher 
for women than men in this age group, both males and 
females are nearly equally likely to remain in the same 
job for up to 52 months ( 12. 1 percent for males and I 1.9 
percent for females). Where slightly more than one-in-
twenty new employment spells last 52 months or more 
among teenagers and young adults, the same is true for 
more than one-in-ten employment spells involving prime 
working-age adults. It is important to note that the results 
generated thus far suggest that women do not have 
generally higher rates of job mobility compared to men. 
Figure 4: Estimated survival rates for workers aged 
25 to 45. 
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Figure 5: Estimated hazard rates for workers aged 46 
to 64. 
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Figure 6: Estimated survival rates for workers aged 
46 to 64. 
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Finally. Figures 5 and 6 show the estimated hazard and 
survival rates for males and females between the ages of 
46 and 64. The sample sizes for computing these 
statistics arc 35.475 for males and 28,990 for females. 
The decline in the hazard rate for this older-age group is 
more pronounced initially than that of the prime working-
aged group shown earlier. It falls from an initial monthly 
rate of more than I 0 percent for both males and females 
to eventual monthly rates of around 2 percent beyond two 
years on the job. This short-term job churning may be an 
artefact of individuals approaching the end of their 
working lives when long-term employment relationships 
have already ended. Remember that these patterns of 
labour market churning arc computed fer jobs that only 
began between May 1999 and April 2000. Thus, they 
ignore any jobs that commenced prior to May 1999. 
The rei :Hionship of hazard and survival rates between 
older males and females is somewhat different from what 
we've already seen earlier among younger workers. Like 
the t\\'O previous age groups. females have lower 
cstin1ated hazard rates than males over the first year on 
the job. These gender di ffercnccs. however. are larger 
than those found earlier. Moreover. this pattern is not 
offset by relatively higher hazard rates for females after 
one year on the job. The result is a uniformly higher 
survi\'al protile for older \VOnlen relative to older men. 
Once in a job afte r age 45. women arc more likefr than 
men to remain in that job for anytime up to 52 months. 
The probabilities of this oldest age group remaining in a 
job for 5~ or more months arc estimated to be 15.o 
percent for males and 17.'3 percent for females. Again. 
this tinding reinforces the previously stated conclusion 
that \\'Omen do not display generally higher rates of job 
mohility compared to men. 
Differing C haracteristics of Job Stayers and 
Job C hangers 
This section focuses on the consequences of job mobility 
for the earnings n:cei,·ed by mxkers. We restrict our 
sample to male" \\'hO were between the ages of ~5 and 54 
as of April 1999. This means that no individual could be 
older than 59 by the end of our sample period in April 
~004. This age restriction eliminates some of the 
problems associated with job churn ing that may be 
n:latcd to combining employment with education emly in 
liiC. and transitions into retirement later in life. The 
moti vation for exc luditH!. females is to avoid observinl!. 
~ -
changes in earnings that arc more like ly associated with 
changes in hours of work. Women arc more likely to 
experience volat ility in their work patterns. especially 
during the child-rearing years. Men arc more likely to 
\\'Ork full-time. and if they do work pa11-time arc 
probably less likl'ly to vary their \\'ork patterns over time. 
These age and gender restrictions should result in a 
~ -
sample of \\'Orkcrs \\'ith a greater attachment to the labour 
force and a higher probability of full -time work. 
In addition. the sample is further restricted to individuals 
\\'ho h<l\ e ·stable employment· over dctined periods. For 
\\'hat we call the ·job-changing sample', each individual 
must ha \'e had at least one year of tenure with the same 
employer before a job separation, and at least one year of 
tenure with another employer after the intervening period 
between jobs (which could last for more than one year in 
length). We require these histories of stable employment 
for this job-changing sample to obtain a better picture of 
their earnings patterns in more enduring jobs both before 
and after this transition period. As a result, we ignore in 
this analysis any observations of workers with less stable 
employment histories either before or after th is job 
h X c ange. 
To produce a relevant counterfactual group. the earnings 
histories of workers with at least two years of tenure with 
the same employer during our sample period are also 
produced. We refer to this as the 'job-staying sample·. 
The idea is that the earnings patterns over this two-year 
period can be compared between the samples of job 
changcrs (our experi mental group) and job stayers (our 
control group). We ask, for example. whether or not job 
changers experience either an absolute or relative drop in 
their earnings trajectories with their job transitions. Do 
earnings tend to grow at a slower or fas ter rate after a job 
change? Are these differences related to ei ther the time 
interval between jobs or other observable characteristics 
of either workers or tinns?<~ 
Table 3 reports some descriptive statistics from the job-
changing and job-staying samples. The numbers of 
observations arc reported in the bottom row of this table. 
There arc a total of I 04,327 prime-aged males in our 
database who changed jobs, and spent at least a full year 
with one employer immediately before this job transition, 
and a full year with another employer after this transition. 
There arc a total of 293.568 prime-aged males who stayed 
in the same job for at least two consecutive years. The 
tinal two columns of Table 3 split the job-changing 
sample into those with initially low and high earnings in 
this first period. The suspicion is that the impacts of a job 
change on earnings may be quite different depending on 
the initial earnings of the individual. The job-changing 
san1ple was split between individuals wi th mean monthly 
earnings in the first period either below or above median 
earnings in this sample. 
Workers who didn't change jobs were. on average. older 
than those who did change jobs (38.8 years vs. 37.2 years 
of age at the start of the tirst period). Among those who 
did change jobs. the average worker with initial earnings 
above the sample median was more than one year older 
than the average worker with initial earnings below the 
sample median. Yet. job changcrs with high initial 
earni ngs were still more than a full year younger (37.7 
years) than those who didn · t change jobs ( 38.8 years). 
Individuals who stayed in their jobs tended to work for 
larger firms (with medians of I 04 and I 09 employees in 
the first and second periods. respectively) relative to 
individuals who changed jobs (with medians of 69 and 71 
employees in the two periods). 10 Job changcrs with 
initially low earnings tend to start out in smaller firms. 
but move to larger tirms (an increase from 32 to 39 
employees). Job changers with initially high earnings 
tend to start out in larger firms, but move to smaller tirms 
~ 
(a decline from 161 to 143 employees). 
I 14 Labour. E mploym~nt anc.J Work in Nl·w z~alanc..l 2006 
Mean real monthly earnings are higher for job stayers 
than job changers in both periods. 11 While the average 
earnings of job stayers increased between the two periods 
by 4.8 percent, the average earnings of job changers 
increased by 5.9 percent. 12 This resulted in a narrowing 
of the earnings gap between the two groups. For 
example, the average earnings of job changers were 98.5 
percent of their non-changing counterparts during the first 
twelve months ($3,705.40 divided by $3,76 1.26). This 
gap narrowed to 99.5 percent between the same groups in 
the second twelve months ($3,922.40 divided by 
$3,942.90). Yet, it is important to note that this slightly 
higher growth rate in earnings is not equally distributed 
across those who change jobs. Those with initially low 
earnings experienced an average earnings growth of I 1.0 
percent, while those with initially high earnings had only 
a 2.2 percent growth in earnings between periods. 
Although the average job changer experiences a faster 
growth rate in earnings, the results vary substantially 
across this group relative to their initial earnings. 
Table 3 also shows that changes in earnings between 
periods are relatively more volatile for the job-changing 
sample. Slightly less than two-thirds ( 65.2 percent) of job 
stayers experienced an increase in real earnings between 
periods. A smaller proportion of job changers (6 1.8 
percent) experienced an increase in real earnings between 
periods. For those experiencing a growth in earnings, 
however, the average size of this increase was 
substantially larger for job changers ( 12.4 percent) than 
for job stayers (7.0 percent). For those experiencing a 
decl ine in earnings, the average size of the decrease for 
job changers ( -6.6 percent) was thee-times larger than that 
occurring among job stayers ( -2.2 percent) . 
Within the job-changing sample, those with initially low 
earnings were much more likely to experience an increase 
in earnings (68.6 percent) compared to those with initially 
high earnings (54.9 percent). These increases in earnings 
were much larger in magnitude for those with initially 
low earnings ( 17.2 percent) relative to those with initially 
high earnings (9.7 percent). Among job-changcrs who 
experienced a drop in earnings, the magnitude of these 
declines were smaller for those with initially low earnings 
( -4.9 percent) relative to those with initially high earnings 
(-7.4 percent). 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics on job stayers and job cha ngers from LEED database. 
Job Chanocrs: 
Job Entire Low Initial High Initial 
Variables: Stayers Subsample Earnings Earnings 
Mean Age at Start of I ' 1 Period 38.8 37.2 36.6 37.7 
I si Period - Median Number of Employees in Firm 104 69 32 161 
2"d Period - Median Number of Employees in Firm 109 71 39 143 
151 Period - Mean Monthly Real Earnings for Worker $3,76 1.26 $3,705.40 $2,637.83 $4,772.98 
2"d Period - Mean Monthly Real Earnings for Worker $3,942.90 $3,922.20 $2,962.29 $4,882.13 
%6 in Real Earnings 4.8°1o 5.9% 11.0% 2.2°o 
Proportion Receiving an Increase in Earnings 65.2% 61.8% 68.6% 54.9% 
% 6 in Earnings for those Receiving an Increase 7.0% 12.4% 17.2% 9.7% 
Proportion Receiving an Decrease in Earnings 34.8% 38.2% 31.4% 45.1 % 
% 6 in Earnings for those Receiving a Decrease -2.2% -6.6% -4.9% -7.4% 
I 51 Period - Mean Monthly Real Earnings for Firm $2,613.18 $2,809.82 $2,413.58 $3,506.94 
2"d Period - Mean Monthly Real Earnings for Firm $2,635.33 $3,089.18 $2,784.49 $3,625.23 
% tl in Real Earnings 0.8% 9.9% 15.4% 3.4° 0 
1 si Period - Mean Monthly Real Earnings for Industry $3,390.58 $3,361.95 $3,283.85 $3,440.05 
2"d Period - Mean Monthly Real Earnings for Industry $3,33 1.22 $3,473.88 $3,464.62 $3,483.15 
% 6 in Real Earnings -1.8% 3.3% 5.5% 1.3% 
% with Job Transition < I Month 87.5% 86.4% 88.6% 
% with Job Transition > I Month and < 3 Months 5.6% 6.1 % 5. 1% 
% with Job Transition > 3 Month and < 6 Months 2.7% 2.9% 2.4% 
% with Job Transition > 6 Month and < 12 Months 2.2% 2.5% 1.9% 
% with Job Transition > 12 Months 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 
Number of Observations 293,568 I 04,327 52,164 52, 163 
Notes: Data provided by Statistics New Zealand from the Linked Employer-Employee Data CLEED). The base period is January 2005 in computing 
real earnings using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Workers without a job change spent at least 24 months with the same employer. Workers with a 
job change spent at least 12 months in the first period with one employer. and at least 12 months in the second period with another employer. The 
industry is the two-digit ANZSIC industry. 
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It's easy to summarise these findings. Job stayers are 
sl ightly more likely than job changers to experience an 
increase in real earnings between periods. However, 
these earnings changes are substantially more varied 
among job changers. Job changers who experience an 
increase in earnings do relatively better if they have low 
eamings in the first period, while those who experience a 
decrease in earnings do relative ly worse if they have high 
earnings in the tirst period. Thus, there is evidence of 
'mean reversion ' in the earnings ofjob changers. 
Table 3 also shows what is happening at both the firm and 
industry level. The average real earnings paid by firms in 
which job stayers were located increased by an average of 
only 0.8 percent between periods. The average real 
eamings in industries in which job stayers were employed 
actual ly fell by 1.8 percent. On the other hand, the 
average eamings paid by the firms and industries in 
which job changers were located grew by 9.9 percent and 
3.3 percent, respective ly. These tindings suggest that job 
changers tend to move to both tinns and industries that 
pay relatively higher earnings to all their workers. In 
other words, job changers tend to leave low-paying finns 
and industries in favour of high-paying fim1s and 
industries. 
The firm and industry locat ion of individuals seems to be 
closely related to the different experiences of job 
changers vvith initially low and high earn ings. We saw 
earlier that that job changers with initially low earn ings 
tend to experience substantially larger eamings increases. 
The ave rage earn ings paid by the lirms and industries of 
in itially low-earning job changcrs grew bet\veen periods 
by I 5.4 and 5.5 percent, respecti ve ly. Simi larl y, the lack 
c•f grovvth in individua l eamings fo r those wi th initially 
high eamings is tied to fact that they arc unwilling or 
unable to mo\·c to these high-paying sectors (at least 
p;:~rtly attributable to the observ<1tion that they arc already 
working in high-paying firms and industries). The 
average earni ngs paid by firms and industries of initially 
high-earnings job changcrs increased between periods by 
3.4 percent and I.J percent, respecti ve ly. 
Finally, Table 3 shows the time interva ls between jobs 
experienced by those in job-changing sample. The vast 
majority of job changers (X7.5 percent) spent one month 
or kss bcrween jobs, and these shot1 time intervals were 
more common among those wi th initially high eamings 
(X~.6 percent) compared to those with initially low 
eamings (g6.5 percent). At the other end of the spectrum, 
only 2 percen t of job changcrs spent more than one year 
between jobs. 
Differing Ear nings Trajectories of Job 
Stayers a nd Job C ha ngers 
We know from descriptive stat ist ics reported in Table 3 
that job changers. on average, experience a larger growth 
rate in earn ings between periods compared to job stayers. 
For this reason, we look more carefully at the earnings 
h i~aorics of both job stayers and job changers in this 
section. We do this by plotting the monthly rea l earnings 
figures ror both groups, and further divide the results for 
job changers by both their initial earnings and the time 
interval spent between jobs. These results are displayed 
in Figures 7 through 12. 
A particular feature of these data should be made clear at 
the outset. The original intention of this project was to 
compare 24 months of earnings histories of both job 
stayers and job changers. Although both groups must 
have been in one or two jobs over th is number of months, 
it was not realised unti I later that the first month in a job 
did not provide the intended information on nonnal, 
monthly earnings. This was because the individual could 
have started the job anytime during the first calendar 
month. As a result, average earnings reported for the first 
month refl ect less than normal monthly earnings. To 
keep the earnings histories comparable, we simply 
exclude the earnings from the first month in a job in 
constmcting these profiles. Other problems were 
encountered in putting together the data on earnings in the 
last month of the second period. For these reasons, the 
earnings histories for job stayers are taken over 22 
months in that job, while the earnings histories for job 
changers arc taken over 21 months (I I months in the first 
j ob and I 0 month in the second job). 
The average earnings histories of job changers and job 
stayers are shown in Figure 7. The earnings profile for 
job stayers is displayed in blue, while the profiles for job 
changers arc purple for the first job and green for the 
second job. The narrowing of the earnings gap between 
job stayers and job changers is apparent in these profiles. 
It comes from two distinct sources. Fi rstly, the job change 
appears to be associated with a slight upward shift in the 
eamings trajectories fo r this group. This is equiva lent to 
an increase in the ve rti cal intercept in the eamings profile. 
Secondly, the growth rate in earnings over the final ten-
month period is s lightly higher for job changers than for 
job stayers. This is equiva lent to a steeper slope in the 
earnings profile. However, this steeper slope in the 
eamings protile of job changers appears to predate this 
job transition. The combination of a slight upward shift 
in the vertical intercept and steeper earnings profile 
resu lts in the elimination in the earnings gap between job 
stayers and job changers by the end of the second period. 
Figure 7: Mea n rea l ea rnings profiles for job stayers 
and j ob changers. 
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Figure 8 compares the separate earnings profiles for job 
changers who are initially above and below median 
earnings to the same counterfactual earnings trajectory for 
job stayers.13 The reason for the different earnings results 
in the second period for job changers shown in Figure 7 is 
immediately obvious. Where the job change appears to 
result in a substantial increase in the vertical intercept for 
the average earnings profile of initially low-earning 
individuals, it slightly decreases the vertical intercept for 
initially high-earning individuals. Thus, a key to the 
narrowing of the overall earnings profiles between job 
stayers and job changers is the increase in the starting 
earnings in the new job among low in itial earners in the 
latter group. 
Figure 8: Mean real earnings profiles for job stayers 
and job changers (below and above median earnings). 
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Figure 9: Mean real earnings profiles for job stayers 
and job changers (job transition one month or less). 
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The same two-figure analysis is repeated for the job-
changing sample by the length of time interval between 
jobs. In each case, the earnings profile for the job-staying 
sample remains the same. Recall from Table 3 that the 
vast majority of job changers (87.5 percent) spent on_e 
month or less between jobs. Figure 9 shows that the1r 
earnings profile in the first period was consistently ?elow 
that of job stayers. Yet, their earnings profile m the 
second period was consistently above that of job sta~ers. 
The increase in the vertical intercept of the earnmgs 
profile for job changers experiencing a short transition 
period is more than enough to have them 'overtake' the 
earnings profile of job stayers. 
Figure I 0 shows the average earnings profiles for job 
changers experiencing a short transition period for those 
who had earnings in the initial period either above or 
below median earnings in the sample. The high-earning 
group does not suffer the reduction in the vertical 
intercept we had seen earl ier in Figure 8 for all job 
changers. Their earnings profi le over the entire sample 
period looks very similar to that of the job-staying sample 
(albeit with a higher vertical intercept). However, the 
low-earning group of job changers experienced a 
substantial increase in the vertical intercept of their 
earnings profi le after they change jobs. For those with a 
short transi tion period, high-earning job changers do no 
worse, while low-earning job changers do much better in 
terms of earnings trajectories relative to their job-staying 
counterparts. Short transitions allow workers to escape 
low-earning jobs. 
Figure 10: Mean real earnings profiles for job stayers 
and job changers (below and above median earnings -
job transition one month or le~s) 
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Figures I I and 12 show the earnings profi lcs for job 
changers who spent more than one month between jobs. 
There arc substantial differences between the earnings 
profiles of workers who change jobs with short and long 
transitions. Figure 9 showed that, in terms of monthly 
earnings, the average job changer with a short transition 
was able to overtake the average job stayer. Figure I I 
shows that the average job changer with a long transition 
worsened their position relative to that of the average job 
stayer. These job changers saw their vertical intercept 
fall by over 4 percent in real earnings between periods. 
Figure 12 shows the average earnings profiles for job 
changers experiencing a long transi tion period for those 
who had earnings in the initial period ei ther above or 
below median earnings. The low-earning group does not 
substantially improve their earnings posi tion relative to 
that of job stayers in the second period. Their earnings 
profile over the entire sample period looks very similar to 
that of the job-staying sample (albeit with a lower vertical 
intercept). However, the high-earning group of job 
changers experienced a substantial decrease in the vertical 
intercept of their earnings profile after they change jobs. 
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For those with a long transition period, low-earning job 
changers do no better. while high-earning job changers do 
much worse in tcnns of earnings relative to their job-
staying counterparts. For those in high-earning jobs. long 
transi tions seem to be associated with a substantial loss in 
earnmgs . 
.... 
Figure 11 : Mean real earnings profiles for job stayers 
and job changers Uob transition more than one 
month). 
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Figure 12 : 1\l ean real earnings profiles for job stayers 
and job changers (below and above median earnings -
job transition more than one month). 
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Regression Analyses on the Link Between 
Job Mobility and Ea rnin gs 
The descript i,·e stati stics in the previous section point to a 
complex relationship between job rnobility and earnings. 
Job stayers generally receive higher earnings than job 
changers. Yet. on an~ragc. this earnings gap narrows 
\\'ith a job change once the individual is in a new job that 
bsts for at least one year. However, this relati ve growth 
~ 
in earnings among job <.:hangers is not unifoml. and 
appears to be concentrated among those with relati' ely 
short job transitions and. more importantly. those 
recei' ing initially lo\\' earnings. lt is possible, of course. 
that changes in n:a l earnings for both job stayers and job 
changcrs may be re lnted to other observable factors. For 
this reason. we turn to regress ion analys is in this section. 
A simple regression specification is used to estimate the 
partial effects of job mobility on earnings growth. This 
specification is adapted from the one used by Holzer et al. 
(2004 ). The dependent variable is the difference in the 
natural logarithms of mean real monthly earnings 
between the two observed periods for the individual. The 
result can be interpreted as the growth rate in average real 
earnings between the two periods. 14 This change in the 
natural logarithm of earnings is regressed against a set of 
independent va riables contained in the vector X; (see 
Equation (I) below). We add variables to th is list of 
regressors in an e ffort to see how sensitive the key 
coefficient estimates are to the inclusion of other 
covariatcs. These independent variables include personal , 
firm and industry-level characteristics . 
Ll ln(Earni ) = x;p + ui ( I) 
Tabk 4 reports the results from four different 
speci lications of this earnings growth equation. There are 
397.895 individual observations in this estimation. The 
tirst speci tication includes only a constant tenn and a 
dummy variable for a job change. The implici t 
assumption is that all indi viduals are identical except for 
the effect of a job change on the growth in earnings 
between periods. The estimated coefficient on this 
dummy ,·ariable is 0.002. and it 's statistically different 
from zero at better than a 5 percent leve l. These results 
sugges t that the average growth in mean real monthly 
earni ngs between periods is only 0.2 percentage points 
higher for job changers. Reca ll from Table 3 that the 
growth rate in mean real monthly earnings was 1.1 
pen.:cntage points higher for job changers compared to 
job stayers. These differences must be due to the way in 
which these growth rates are computed. The descriptive 
statistics in Tabk 3 are based on the percentage change in 
mean earni ngs between periods for each group. while the 
regression results arc based on the individual difference 
in the log of mean earnings between periods . 
The second regression specification listed in Table 4 
includes a number of additional explanatory variables. 
Note that the overa ll explanatory power of this model 
' ' tncrcases substantial ly. The R- statistic in speci fication 
( I ) suys that less than 0. I percent of the variation in the 
growth rate in earn ings between periods can be explained 
by job mobility alone. The R~ statistic in specitica tion (2) 
says that 13.0 percent of the variation in the growth rate 
in earnings between periods can be explained by the 
regressors in th is model. 
The inclusion of age and age squared in this regress ion on 
the ch~11.1 ge in earnings implies a cubic age-earnings 
prolile. 1 ~ The estimated coefficients on age and age 
squared arc negative and positive, respectively, and both 
arc signi fi cantly different from zero at better than a one 
percent level. This suggests that earnings growth declines 
non-linearly with age. 
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Table 4: Ordinary least-squares regression results- Entire sample dependent variable: Difference in individual 
log mean earnings between periods. 
Independent Vari~bles: 
Constant 
Dummy Variable for Job Change 
Age/10 
(Age/l 0)2 
6 Firm Log Mean Earnings between Periods 
6 Firm Mean Employees between Periods 
6 Industry Log Mean Earnings between Periods 
Index for Start of First Period 
Job Tenure at Start of First Period 
Individual Log Mean Earnings in First Period 
Time Interval between Jobs 
Adjusted R 2 Statistic 
Number of Observations 
· Sign ificantly different from zero at I 0° o level using a two-tailed test. 
· · Significantly different from zero at 5° o level. using a two-tailed test. 
··· Significantly different from zero at l0 o leH~ I using a two-tailed test. 
(I) 
0.043 ... 
(0.000) 
0.002 •• 
(0.00 I) 
0.000 
Specification: 
(2) (3) (4) 
0.124"' 0.341 ... 0.360 ... 
(0.008) (0.0 I 0) (0.0 I 0) 
-o.oo5··· -o.oo5··· -0.003 ••• 
(0.00 I) (0.00 I) (0.00 I ) 
-0.046 ••• 
-0.034··· -0.036 ... 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
0.004 ••• o.oof·· 0.003 ••• 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.34o··· 0.335··· 0.332··· 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
0.002··· 0.002··· 0.002 ... 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.0 12 -0.018. -0.009 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
0.0 15 ... 0.014 ... ••• 0.013 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.004 ••• 0.006··· 0.005 ... 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.030 ... -0.030 ••• 
(0.00 I) (0.00 I) 
-0.009 ••• 
(0.000) 
0.130 0.133 0.138 
397.895 
Notes: Data provided by Statistics New Zealand from the Linked Employer-Employl'e Database ( LEED1. The ·Mean Firm Employees' are measured 
in thousands for this regression. The variable ' Index for Start of the First Period' measures in years when the first period started (April 1999 is set 
equal to zero). The variable ·Job Tenure at Start of First Period' measun:s in years the consecutive months in the job held in the tirst period since the 
start of our sample period in April 1999. The ' Interval Between Jobs· is also measured in yea rs. 
The most important single determinant of the growth rate 
in individual earnings is the growth in firm-level earnings 
between the two periods. The estimated coefficient is 
0.340 and significant at better than a one percent leve l. 
This says that a l 0 percent increase in the average real 
monthly earnings paid by the firm (or firms), in which the 
individual was employed, is associated with a 3.4 percent 
increase in individual earnings. On average. workers 
experience a higher growth in their own earnings if they 
remain with a firm (or switch to another firm) that pays 
higher earnings to all of its employees. 
The number of employees in the firm has a posi ti ve and 
statistically significant effect on the growth rate in 
individual earnings. However, the magnitude of this 
effect is relatively small. This variable is measured in 
thousands of employees at the firm. Thus, an increase of 
one thousand employees in the firm, on average, 
increases the growth rate in earnings by 0.2 percentage 
points. 
Once firm-level changes in average earnings and number 
of employees have been held constant, the growth rate in 
industry earnings between the periods has no measurable 
impact on the growth rate in individual earnings. The 
estimated coefficient on this variable is -0.012. but it is 
not significantly different from zero at a I 0 percent leve l. 
Because these observed 24-month employment histories 
could begin anytime between April 1999 and May 2002, 
a time trend was included to capture any systematic 
changes in the growth rate in earnings over this short 
sample period. This index variable is measured in years. 
with a starting value of zero in April 1999. The estimated 
coefticient on this variable is 0.0 15, and is statistically 
significant at a I percent level. This says that the growth 
rate in real earnings between periods increased by an 
average 1.5 percentage points per year. This is consistent 
wi th a period of relative high economic growth and a 
tightening labour market over this sample period. 
Job tenure at the start of the first period is censored from 
the beginning of sample period in April 1999. This 
variable is measured in years, but it' s computed from the 
number of consecutive months of employment with that 
firm over the observable period. The estimated 
coefficient on tenure is 0.004, and is statistically 
significant at a I percent level. This suggests that, on 
average, each additional year of job tenure increases the 
growth rate in real earnings between periods by 0.4 
percentage points. 
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Once these other covariates have been held constant, the 
estimated coefficient on the dummy variable for a job 
change switches signs. When it was included as the only 
explanatory variable in this regression. it had a positive 
and signiticant impact on earnings growth. However, 
once these other determinants of earnings growth have 
been included in the model, the estimated coefficient on 
the job change variable becomes -0.005. and is 
signiticantly different from zero at a I percent level. This 
says that the growth rate in earnings between periods is 
0.5 percentage points lower for job chnagers compared to 
otherwise observationally equivalent job stayers. 
Two determinants of earnings growth were found to be 
particularly responsible for this reversal in the estimated 
coeftic ien t on a job change. Firstly. the inclusion of age 
and age squared captures the important relationship 
between age and earnings growth. Younger workers arc 
on steeper segments of the age-earnings profile. and are 
more likely to change jobs. Thus. the higher earnings 
growth rate for younger workers was inappropriately 
attributed to job mobility under the regrcss1on 
specification (I). 
Second ly. inc luding both the change in mean earnings 
and the number of employees in the tirm (or tirms) 
between periods captures the critical importance of firm 
characteristics on individual earnings. Whether or not 
workers change jobs. bcing employed by a larger. higher-
paying employer directly intluences the earnings of 
indi\·idual workers. Recall from the descriptive statistics 
in Table 3 that job changers arc more likely to experience 
a substantial increase in average firm-kvel carninus 
~ ~ 
compared to job stayers and they tend to move to firms 
with more employees. These related aspects of a job 
change arc more important ro this outcome than the job 
change itsel f. A job change per se does not result in 
t~tstc r earnings growth. lt is because job changes are 
._.._ ~ .._ 
often coupled with the movements to larger. higher-wage 
employers that ultimately lead to larger increases in 
individual eamings. 
The third regress ion specification in Table -+ adds a 
va riable on ind ividua I log mean cam i ngs in the ti rst 
period. The estimated cocfticicnt on this va riable is 
negative. and is signiticant at better than a I percent level. 
These results suggest that a I 0 percent increase in real 
monthly camings in the tirst period is associated with an 
average decrease in the growth in earnings between 
~ ~ ~ 
periods of O.J percent. H ighcr initial earnings generally 
lead to sma ller subsequent increases in individual 
earnings. This suggests that there is some ' regression 
toward the mean· in thi s process. 
The inclusion of this va riable on initi al earnings does not 
substantially alter the coeffic ient estimates on other 
independent va riables in this model. In par1icular. the 
estimated coefficient on a job change continues to have a 
negat ive and signiticant impact on earnings growth 
between periods. 
The final regress ion specification reported in Table 4 
adds a variable on the time interval between jobs 
(conditional on experiencing a job change). This variable 
is the effective number of years between jobs, and is 
defined as the number of months during this transition 
period divided by twelve.'~> The estimated coefficient on 
this variable is -0.009. and is statistically significant at 
better than a one percent level. This says that for each 
year elapsed between jobs, the growth rate in eammgs 
declines by an average of0.9 percentage points. 
When the time interval between jobs is included in the 
regression. the estimated coefficient on the dummy 
variable for a job change declines in magnitude to -0.003, 
but continues to be significantly different from zero at a I 
percent level. This says that, holding other things 
constant. a job change that results in no ti me elapsed 
between jobs lowers the growth rate in earnings between 
periods by 0.3 percentage points. Yet, a job change with 
a time interval of one year between jobs leads to an 
average decline in the growth rate in earnings of 1.2 
percentage points (the sum of the estimated coefficients 
on a job change -0.003 and the time interval between jobs 
-0.009). This latter result is consistent with job search 
theory, where individuals reduce reservation wages with 
the length of the search period and accept increasingly 
lower earnings in new jobs with the time elapsed in the 
search process. This finding is also consistent with 
depreciation in human capital that is positively related to 
length of time out of employment. 
We can quickly summarise the regression results reported 
in Table 4. The tinal set of results listed in the last 
column represents our preferred speci fication. The 
introduction of the two independent variables between 
specifications (2) and (4) raises the explanatory power of 
the regression model by nearly 6.2 percent (i.e., the R:! 
statistic increases from 0.130 to 0.138). We can 
separately reject the null hypotheses that the coefficients 
on these additional regressors arc equal to zero at better 
than a I percent level. This tinal specification highlights 
the complex nature of the relationship between job 
mobi I ity and earnings. On average. job changes 
themselves have only a small negative impact on the 
growth in earnings. They lead to higher individual 
earnings growth if the worker moves to a firm that 
generally pays higher earnings and has more employees. 
The job change also significantly reduces earnings growth 
as the time interval between jobs increases. 
The specification of the regression models reported in 
Table 4 assumed implicitly that the coefticients on the 
vec tor of explanatory variables were identical between 
job changers and job stayers. We test this assumption by 
separately estimating the relevant regression 
specitications for these two groups. These regression 
results arc reported in Tables 5 and 6. Only two 
regression spcc i fications are estimated for job stayers. 
This is because some of the original specifications are 
irrelevant for this group (the regression that includes the 
dummy va ri able for a job change as the only regressor. 
and the last model that adds the variable on the time 
interva l between jobs). 
There arc a number of points to make regarding the 
estimated determinants of earnings growth among job 
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stayers. Firstly, compared to the regression results for the 
entire sample, age has little impact on this earnings 
growth. The estimated coefficients on age and age 
squared are insignificant in three of the four situations. 
The only coefficient that is statistically different from 
zero is related to age in the second specification. This 
may be because job stayers are older and generally 
located on flatter segments of the age-earnings profile. 
Secondly, individual growth rates in earnings between 
periods are more closely associated with the 
characteristics of the firm among job stayers. The 
estimated coefficients on the difference in log mean 
earnings and the difference in mean number of employees 
between periods are both positive, statistically significant 
and larger in magnitude than those found in the overall 
sample. A I 0 percent growth in real mean earnings at the 
firm, on average, is estimated to increase individual 
earnings by more than 4.1 percent. This compares to a 
similar increase of no more than 3.4 percent in individual 
earnings from Table 4. An increase of one-thousand 
employees at the firm, on average, increases the growth 
rate in earnings by 0.4 percentage points. This compares 
to 0.2-percentage-point increase from the same rise in the 
number of employees reported in Table 4. Firm 
characteristics appear to play a relatively larger role in the 
determination of individual earnings growth among job 
stayers. 
Thirdly, job tenure is estimated to reduce the growth rate 
in earnings between periods. One year of tenure reduces 
earnings growth by at least 0.3 percentage points. This is 
in contrast to the positive effects on job tenure that were 
estimated for the entire sample (Table 4). 
Finally, we had seen in Table 4 that there was some 
evidence of regression toward the mean in earnings 
between periods. The estimated coeffi cient on first 
period earnings was negative and significant. In the last 
column of Table 5 we find that the estimated coefficient 
on individual first period earnings is positi ve and 
significant at better than a I percent level. This result 
suggests that a I 0 percent increase in real monthly 
earnings in the first period is associated with an average 
increase in earnings growth between periods among job 
stayers of 1.3 percent. We had previously found that a I 0 
percent increase in real monthly earnings in the first 
period is associated with an average decrease in earnings 
growth between periods among all workers of 0.3 
percent. Having higher earnings in the tirst period tends 
to result in a larger increase in earnings between periods 
only if the worker remains in that job. 
Three separate regression specifications are estimated for 
job changers. These results are reported in Table 6. A 
few important points can be raised. Firstly, age is a 
relatively more important determinant of individual 
growth rates in earnings among job changers. The 
coefficients on age and age squared are consistently 
found to be significantly different from zero, although the 
estimated coefficients on these variables switch signs 
between the first and second specifications. The 
importance of age for earnings growth can be explained 
by job changers being located earlier on age-earnings 
profile where the slope is steeper. 
Secondly, although individual growth rates in earnings 
between periods for job changers are not as closely 
associated wi th firm characteristics as those found for job 
stayers, the coefficients on firm-level differences in log 
mean earnings and differences in mean number of 
employees between periods are still positive and 
stati sti cally significant. 
Table 5: Ordinary least-squares regression results -
job stayers dependent variable: Difference in 
individual log mean earnings between periods. 
Independent Variables: 
Constant 
Age/ I 0 
, (Agc/ 10)-
6 Firm Log Mean 
Earnings between Periods 
6 Finn Mean Employees 
between Periods 
6 Industry Log Mean 
Earning:; between Periods 
Index for Start of First 
Period 
Job Tenure at Start of First 
Periud 
Individual Log Mean 
Earnings in First Period 
Adjusted R~ Statistic 
Number of Observations 
Specification: 
( I ) (2) 
0.054 ••• -0.038 ... 
(0.007) (0.009) 
-0.003 -0.008 .. 
(0.004) (0.004) 
-0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) 
0.41 3 ••• 0.414 ••• 
(0.003) (0.003) 
o.oo5 ... o.oo5 ... 
(0.00 I) (0.00 I) 
-0.036 -0.038 
(0.030) (0.030) 
0.004 ••• 0.004"' 
(0.000) (0.000) 
-0.003 ... 
-0.004'" 
(0.000) (0.000) 
0.013"' 
(0.00 I) 
0.066 0.067 
293.568 
·Significantly different from zero at 10% level using a 
two-tailed test. 
··Significantl y different from zero at 5% lcvd. using a 
two-ta iled test. 
••• Significantly different from zero at I% level using a 
two-tailed test. 
Nvtcs: Daw prO\ ad~d by Statistics N~w Zco land from the Linked 
Employer-Employee Database (lEED). The 'Mean Firm Employees · 
arc mcasur~d in thousands for this regression . The variable ' Index for 
Start of the First Period· measures in years when the first period started 
{A pril 1999 is set equal to zero). The variable ·Job Tenure at Stort of 
First Period' measure:. in years the consecutive months in the job held in 
the li rst period since the start of our sample period in April 1999. 
Thirdly, both the index for time and job tenure at the start 
of the first period have larger effects on the earnings 
growth of job changers compared to job stayers. Job 
changers receive relatively higher earnings growth 
between jobs if this occurred later in the sample period 
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and if they had acquired more tenure on their first job. 
The first result could be explained by job changers doing 
relatively better than job stayers in the tighter labour 
market near the end of our sample period. The second 
result might be a proxy for vo luntary job mobility. Job 
changers with longer tenure in the first job may be more 
likely to qui t and take up higher paying jobs. 
Tab le 6: Ordinary least-squa res regression results-
job changers dependent variable: Difference in 
individual log mean earnings between periods. 
Independent 
Variables: 
Constant 
Age ' ! 0 
~ 
~ Finn LoQ Mean 
~ 
Eaminl!S between 
~ 
Periods 
~Firm Mean 
Employees 
between Periods 
j. Industry Log 
Mean E<1rn ings 
between Periods 
Index to r Start of 
Fir<\t Period 
Job Tenure at 
Start of First 
Period 
I ndi ,·idual Lol!. 
~ 
Mean Earnincs in 
~ 
First Period 
Time Interval 
bet \\'een J L)bS 
Adjusted R-
Stati stic 
Number or 
Observations 
( I ) 
0.1 18"'' 
(0.022) 
-0.050 ••• 
(0.011) 
0.003 
(0.00 I) 
0.326 
... 
(0.002) 
0.002 ' .. 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
(0.0 I I) 
0.0-lO 
... 
(0.00 I) 
0.0 17 
(0.00 1) 
0. 1 ~2 
Spec i ftcation: 
(1) (3) 
1.208 ••• 1.261 ••• 
(0.0.27) (0.026) 
0.031 
• •• 0.025 • • 
(0.01 1) (0.01 1) 
-0.007 •• • -0.006"' 
(0.001) (0.001) 
0.299 • •• 0.295 • •• 
(0.002) (0.002) 
0.002 ••• 0.002 ... 
(0.000) (0.000) 
-0.035 ... 
-0.026 .. 
(0.011) (0.01 1) 
0.029 0.02-l··· 
(0.00 I) ( 0.00 I) 
0.0 19 0.01-l 
(0.00 1) (0.00 I ) 
-0. 153 
... 
-0. 155 ' .. 
(0.002) (0.002) 
-0.009 ... 
(0.000) 
0.217 0.226 
I 04,3.27 
. S lgn lll~o: ;lllll ~ di l'l' ... ·r ... ·nt rr~li11 /\.'I'll at Ill"" k·\ d usinl.! ;I t\\'~Haiku l<..:SI. 
.. Signillc;111tly Jil'l'..: rl.'nt l'wm;..:ro ;tt :'i" , k\\.:1. using-a t\\U· taikJ t~.·s t. 
... Signili ... ·a nlly Ji rr..:r..:n t 1'1\)111 /l' r\.l at I"., k\ cl using a t \\'~Haiku t.:st. 
~~11.:-o; : Data )11\ 1\ iJ.:-J h) Stat istk:-. 1 1.'\\ Zea land from th.: Linked 
E mpltl~cr- l :mpl ~))'l'l' D:llaba-; ... · ( LI: ED I. Thl' ·:-.kan Firm Empl~.l)l'l'";' 
:trl' m~.·asurcd in tll\Hl,;tnd' I'm thl~ regression. Thl' \ariabk ' )nUl'\ r~lr 
Start nl' thl' hr,t Pcri~1d' m...::lo;url.'s in yl':~ro; '' h.:n th~.· first pl'ri~ld :;wn~.·d 
(. \pn l I<J•N '' , ... ·tcqu:iltotcn,l. Th~.· '''rial-lk ·Job Tl'nurc at Start ~~r 
hr~t P~.·m1u· m.::hurc' 111 y~·ar' the ... -~~n:-l.'<:u ti\ <.' nwnths in th~.· j~1b hdd in 
th~.· llr't Jll.'fiOd 'llll'\.' the 'tan or \lllr ~:tmplc p~.·rioJ in :\pril i99lJ. Till.' 
' lntc'f\ ;il Bl'l\\ l'~·n .l\llh · '' aJ,\l ll11.':"urcd in yl.'ars. 
Finally. we lint.! e\ idcnce or a strong regress ion toward 
the m~an among jcJb changers. The estimated codTicicnt 
on this v~1 riablc is nega ti ve and signilicant at better than a 
one rercent lc\·cl. These results suggest that <1 I 0 percent 
increase in real monthly earn ings in the tirst period is 
associJtecJ with an averal!.c decrease in the growth in 
~ ~ 
earnings between periods of more than 
Higher initial earnings generally lead 
subsequent increases in ind ividual earnings. 
Conclusions 
1.5 percent. 
to smaller 
This study has provided some preliminary empirical 
resul ts on the extent and nature of job mobi li ty in New 
Zealand. and its possible effects on individual earnings. 
This analysis required data on individual employment and 
earnings histories, which was provided by Statistics New 
Zealand from the Linked Employer-Employee Data 
( LEED). Administrative data taken from monthly, 
employer PAYE reports to the Inland Revenue 
Department allow us to follow individuals through job 
transitions and their associated effects on the earnings. 
The LEED also makes it possible to examine the role of 
some individual, firm and industry characteristics on 
these outcomes. 
Consistent with overseas studies, there is evidence of both 
a great deal of job chuming and job stability in New 
Zealand. More than four-fifths of employees work for a 
single employer in any year. Once in a job for more than 
two years. the probabilities of leaving that job decline 
substantially. Yet , at any point in time nearly one-third of 
workers have been in their jobs for less than one year, and 
almost one-ha If of workers have been in their jobs for less 
than two years. A great deal ofjob chuming occurs over 
the tirst few years in a job. For example, estimated 
monthly hazard rates for teenagers and young adults (the 
probability of terminating a job in any given month) can 
be as high as I 0 percent. This job churning diss ipates 
over time. Hazard rates can fall below 1 percent after 
three or more years of job tenure. These observations are 
consistent with theories of job matching behaviour. Poor 
matches between firms and workers dissolve early in the 
relationsh ip. while good matches endure for much longer 
periods of time. 
Di fferenccs in hazard and survival rates were estimated 
by age and gender. Job mobility was found to be 
negative ly related to age. Among teenagers and young 
adults. only about one job in twenty lasts for 52 or more 
weeks. Yet. among older adults, more than one job in six 
wi ll last tor at least that same period. Somewhat 
surprisingly, overall job mobility was found to be largely 
unrelated to gender. For younger and middle-aged 
workers, job mobility was relatively higher for males over 
the first two years in a job. but relatively higher tor 
fema les alter tvvo years on job tenure. Differences 
between males and females in the probabi I ity of staying 
in a job to r 52 weeks or more were negligible. In fact, 
among indi viduals aged between 45 and 64. survival rates 
were found to be consistently higher for women. 
To gauge the impact of job mobility on earnings. we 
compared two samples constructed from the LEED data. 
Our 'job stayers' were individuals who remained with the 
same employer for at least two years. while ·job 
changcrs' were individuals who swi tched employers. but 
remained with an employer for at least one year both 
before and after this job transition. In this way, we could 
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compare the earnings trajectories of job changers before 
and after this transition and relative to the experiences of 
this 'counterfactual' group. 
Overall, individuals changing jobs received lower 
earnings than those remain with their employers. 
Average growth rate in earnings between periods were 
found to be higher for job changers. Mean real monthly 
earnings increased between periods by 4.8 percent for job 
stayers and 5.9 percent for job changers. The implication 
is that job mobility may provide mechanism for 
individuals to raise their earnings. 
The relationship between job mobility and earnings is 
found to be complex. Earnings profiles show that the 
narrowing of the earnings gap between job stayers and 
job changers is the result of both an increase in the 
' starting salary' in the new job (equivalent to an intercept 
change in the earnings profile) and a slightly faster 
growth in monthly earnings over both periods (equiva lent 
to an increase in the slope of the earnings profile). But 
this positive intercept change is relegated to those with 
initially low earnings. For job changers with initia lly 
high earnings who spend more than one month between 
jobs, the intercept change is negative. 
Because of the large number of factors that could 
influence individual earnings in addition to a job change, 
some simple regression models were estimated. In the 
first set of regressions, the difference between the natural 
logarithms in real mean monthly earnings between the 
two periods (i.e., a proxy for the growth rate in earnings) 
was regressed against several groups of covariates. The 
estimated effect of a job change on the growth in earnings 
was highly dependent on the inclusion of other variables 
in the regression. When a dummy variable for a job 
change was included as the sole explanatory variable, a 
small but positive and statistically signi ficant effect on 
earnings growth was found. When controls for age and 
firm characteri stics were added. this estimated effec t of a 
job change became negative and significant. This basic 
result continued to hold as other covariates were added to 
the regression model. 
One thing that does come through in these regressions is 
the importance of firm characteristics for ea rn ings 
growth. This result holds for both job stayers and job 
changers. Although job transitions in general may have 
little impact on the growth in earnings, moving to an 
employer that generally pays higher average monthly 
earnings tends to a growth tends to substantially increase 
individual earnings. Similarly, moving to a larger finn 
(i.e ., one with more employees) is also associated with a 
higher growth in individual earnings. Job changes 
themselves generally lead to a slight decrease in earn ings 
growth, and this negati ve effect becomes larger as the 
time interval between jobs increases. Only a job change 
that results in a move to a larger, higher-paying firm can 
be expected to lead to a faster growth in individual 
earnmgs. 
Future Research 
There is much more work to be done in this area before 
we can get a definitive picture of the relationship between 
job mobility and individual earn ings. At this point, it 
would be difficult to say how important job mobility is to 
the average level of earnings or the overall dispersion of 
earnings in the labour market. One important element in 
any future analysis on this topic will be to obtain some 
direct or indirect information on the hours worked by 
these individuals each month, so that we could move 
from monthly earnings to something closer to hourly 
earnings. This issue, and a number of other concerns 
raised in this current report, should be addressed in future 
research in this area. In addition, information on the 
reason for a job separation may add substantially to our 
understanding of the relationship between job mobili ty 
and earnings. At this point, no information exists in the 
LEED that would distinguish between a job quit and job 
dismissal or redundancy. Some of what we are currently 
finding in this study on the various measurable 
determinants of earnings changes may be related to this 
missing variable. 
Notes 
This research report was commissioned by 
Statistics New Zealand as part of its Ofticial 
Stati stics Research programme. Research funded 
through this programme is intended to strengthen 
the Official Statistics System by improving 
statistics and increasing the understanding of those 
statisti cs. Special thanks go to Wesley Thompson 
of Stati stics New Zealand who was responsible for 
producing the raw data, descriptive stati stics and 
regression results reported in this paper. The final 
version of this paper benefited from the comments 
of Davc Mare , Sylvia Dixon and other anonymous 
referees. Any remaining errors are my own. 
' Both studies currently have around one thousand 
or fewer respondents. Interv iews have been 
conducted at approximately fi ve-year intervals 
after these respondents reached adulthood. Both 
small sample size and infrequent interv iews would 
be problematic for any analys is of job mobili ty. 
3 Two drawbacks of these data arc that these 
employment histories exclude any self-
employment and employment that results in 
earnings not reported to IRD (i.e.. earnings 
generated from the underground or cash 
economy). The former is likely to be added to this 
database in the future. 
4 The LEED could be considered a census rather 
than a survey, since these administrative data 
capture all reported employment relationships that 
involve income taxes withheld from employee pay 
and remitted to In land Revenue. Yet, it is referred 
to as a ' sample' because it does not include the 
self-employed and employment relationships 
where income taxes are not withheld (i .e., those 
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associated with the underground or cash 
economy). 
In situations where the individual has earnings 
from multiple employers over the sample period, 
relevant infonnation will be taken from the 
dominant employer (the one with whom the 
individual receives the highest earnings). Sec 
Holzer et al (2004) for a similar definition of the 
'primary job·. 
Given the restrictions of our sample period, a 
maximum of 24 months of tenure in a job was 
considered sufficient to provide some infonnation 
about the extent of churning in the labour market. 
These observation periods can be increased in the 
future as more months are added to the LEED. 
Again. we have no direct infonnation in the LEED 
data on which of the two parties might have 
initiated the job separation. We cannot distinguish 
between 'job quits' and either 'dismissals' or 
·redundancies' in this data set. 
lt would be a useful extension of this research to 
consider the earnings pattems of workers who 
change jobs with less stable employment histories 
on either side of this event. or with multiple job 
changes within a short time interval. 
A number of key decisions had to be made in 
selecting observations on job changing and job 
staying behaviour. Firstly, the history of a s ingle 
individual could contribute more than a single 
observation to our samples. For example. 
someone could have a long period of stable 
employment. followed by a job transition to 
another fim1. We decided at the outset that any 
individual could contribute at most one 
observation to either the job changing or job 
staying samples. Secondly. we searched for these 
observations of these employment histories in a 
particular sequence. Examples of job changing 
behaviour were selected first. Examples of job 
stayi ng behaviour were then taken from the 
remaining indi viduals. Finally. this search was 
conducted in reverse chronological order. We 
started with the last month in our dataset (April 
2004) and worked backward in time. This was 
done to provide some variation in the observed 
tenure of individuals in their jobs in the first period 
back to the tirst month in our sample period (April 
1999). In the end. job tenure in our sample is 
censored and can not exceed much more than three 
years in length. 
Numbers of employees in finns were surprisingly 
high. This is due largely to the way in which the 
employer is dctined in LEED. Firm employment 
is aggregated across multiple geographic locations. 
Someone working in a retail outlet. for example. is 
assigned the aggregate employment of that firm in 
all similar outlets throu~hout New Zealand and not 
~ 
the number of workers in that particular location. 
I I 
12 
13 
-
One concrete example involves school teachers. 
The number of employees in this case is not the 
number of teachers in a particular school, but the 
number of school teachers in the country. Any 
future analysis of the importance of finn size for 
ind ividual earnings should distinguish between the 
overall number of employees for an employer, and 
the number of employees m a particular 
geographic location. 
All dollar figures reported here are inflated to 
January 2005 dollars using the Consumer Price 
Index. 
lt should be noted that these 12-month periods for 
the two groups may not correspond to comparable 
calendar periods. Although earnings infonnation 
is taken from 24 consecutive months for job 
stayers, the two 12-month periods for job changers 
may be separated by a number of months or even 
years. During a period of steady growth in real 
earnings this would tend to increase the relative 
growth in earnings of job changers between 
periods. We address this issue in subsequent 
sections of this report by separately controlling for 
the length of the time interval between jobs for this 
job-changing sample. 
Note that the dollar units of the vertical axes are 
di ffcrent between Figures 7 and 8. 
14 As before. the sample is restricted to individuals 
who had at least 24 months in the same job Uob 
stayers) or two 12-month periods in different jobs 
on either side of a job transition Uob changers). 
15 Age is divided by I 0 before inclusion in this 
regression. This was done to make the coefficient 
estimates meaningful within the first few places to 
the right of the decimal point. 
16 The variable is set equal to zero for individuals 
who don't experience a job change. The number 
of months in transition is equal one if an individual 
took one month or more to find a new job, two if 
they took between two months or more, etc. 
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